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Abstract. We describe an approach to zero-sum partitions using Todo’s
division property at EUROCRYPT 2015. It follows the inside-out method-
ology, and includes MILP-assisted search for the forward and backward
trails, and subspace approach to connect those two trails that is less
restrictive than commonly done.
As an application we choose PHOTON, a family of sponge-like hash
function proposals that was recently standardized by ISO. With respect
to the security claims made by the designers, we for the first time show
zero-sum partitions for almost all of those full 12-round permutation
variants that use a 4-bit S-Box. As with essentially any other zero-sum
property in the literature, also here the gap between a generic attack and
the shortcut is small.
Key words: PHOTON, Integral, Division Property, Zero-sum, MILP,
Subspace
1 Introduction
Hash functions are one of the most important primitives in symmetric-key cryp-
tography. Sponge functions [6] are a way of building hash functions from a fixed
permutation. Modern cryptanalytic approaches target both hash function prim-
itives and underlying ciphers or permutations. Internal components are indeed
expected to provide certain properties and for verifying their closeness to ideal
behavior it is important to evaluate the security of hash functions. The analysis
of hash functions underlying block ciphers or permutations is often done in the
known-key model, as introduced by Knudsen and Rijmen in [20].
In this paper, we exhibit the very first zero-sum partitions based on the inte-
gral property on the full permutation of some PHOTON variants, a lightweight
hash function proposed by Guo et al. [18] at CRYPTO 2011 and recently stan-
dardized by ISO.
1.1 Background on the Integral Distinguishers, Zero-sum
Distinguishers and Division Property
Integral and Zero-Sum Distinguishers. A possible analysis of the inner
permutation of a hash function is based on the zero-sum property, which can be
seen as a generalization of an integral property [21]. The integral attack, also
known as square attack, is originally proposed by Knudsen to analyze SQUARE
block cipher [10]. There are several variants of the integral attack with different
names: multiset attack [7], saturation attack [23], and collision attack [15]. In-
tegral distinguishers mainly make use of the observation that when fixing some
parts of the plaintext, the specific parts of the ciphertext have balanced prop-
erty, i.e. each possible partial value occurs the exact same number of times in
the output.
In more details, a zero-sum structure for a function f is defined as a set Z of
inputs zi that sum to zero, and for which the corresponding outputs f(zi) also
sum to zero (see Aumasson and Meier[3]). For an iterated function, the existence
of many zero-sums is usually due either to the particular structure of the round
function or to a low degree. Since it is expected that a randomly chosen function
does not have many zero-sums, the existence of several such sets of inputs can be
seen as a distinguishing property of the internal function. By using the inside-
out technique, zero-sums could be constructed starting from the middle, and be
extended to forward and backward direction as far as possible.
Division Property. As we have already said, a zero-sum property can be found
working on the degree of the function. As an example, if f is a k-degree func-
tion on F2n , then it is proved that
⊕
v∈V⊕a f(v) = 0 for any (k + 1)-dimension
subspace V ⊆ F2n where V ⊕ a is an arbitrary coset of V (see Higher Order
Differential [22] for details). The main approach to construct zero-sum distin-
guishers is related to find accurate estimations on the degree of both the forward
and backward permutations that define the encryption/hash function f .
As a generalized integral property, division property was proposed by Todo
at EUROCRYPT 2015 [27] to search integral distinguishers for symmetric-key
primitives including SPNs and Feistel structures. Taking SPNs - which are also
the main focus of this paper - as an example, the main idea was to formu-
late the propagation of division property through an S-Box, where the S-Box
was regarded as unknown but restricted only by its algebraic degree. Moreover,
since the degree remains the same while going through linear permutations,
division property propagation through the permutation layer can easily be mod-
eled. Based on these, new integral distinguishers for many SPN ciphers have
been constructed. One prominent example was the application to MISTY1 [26],
where the S-Box S7 was shown to have an important vulnerability in terms of
division property. By employing this a new 6-round integral distinguisher was
constructed, and a full-round attack on MISTY1 was achieved for the first time.
At CRYPTO 2016, Boura and Canteaut [9] proposed a new notion, called parity
set, to study division property from the coding theory(’s) point of view, based
on which they found better integral distinguishers for PRESENT.
Motivated by narrowing the 5 rounds gap between the integral distinguishers
for SIMON32 in [31] and [27], bit-based division property [28] was introduced at
FSE 2016, where the division property of each bit was treated independently. As
a result, the 14-round integral distinguishers for SIMON32 in [31] were found.
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However, as pointed out in [28], for a block cipher with block size n, the time and
memory complexity is lower bounded by 2n. As most ciphers adopt block size
larger than 32, this makes searching integral distinguisher by bit-based division
property under this framework computationally infeasible.
To solve this problem, Xiang et al. [32] built an automatic tool based on
mixed integer linear programming (MILP) to study the division property of
SPNs with bit-permutation linear layers (e.g. PRESENT). They first introduced
notion division trail to build the objective function, then represented the oper-
ations of the ciphers by linear (in)equalities to constrain the objective function.
After setting the required stopping rules of searching division trails, they could
determine the existence of certain number of rounds integral distinguishers by
optimizing the MILP. As a result, they found many interesting integral distin-
guishers for the targeted ciphers. Later, a MILP automatic tool for SPNs with
non-bit-permutation linear layers (mainly MDS matrices) was studied in [24].
It shows that an automatic tool based on bit-based division property is very
powerful in the search of better integral distinguishers, and therefore we for
the first time apply it to construct zero-sum distinguishers for symmetric-key
primitives which we will pursue in the following.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper we focus on zero-sum distinguishers exploiting the recent division
property developments in the searching integral distinguishers and provide much
improved results compared to earlier works. As an application, we choose the in-
ternal permutation of PHOTON, which is a lightweight hash function proposed
by Guo et al. [18] at CRYPTO 2011 and has been standardized in ISO/IEC
29192-5:2016, to demonstrate our new techniques. As the “idealness” of the un-
derlying permutation is important for security properties that are expected for
a sponge-based hash function using it, the PHOTON designers claim particular
security levels for each of their variants. We exhibit for the first time distinguish-
ers of the full number of rounds with a complexity that is below the designers
claims1 (except the one with internal state size 100, for which we present a
distinguisher on 11 out of 12 rounds).
Our concrete results are summarized in Table 1. For achieving these results,
we use an approach that combines various ideas from related areas which we
summarize in the following:
Inside-out approach for division-property distinguishers. The inside-out
approach was perhaps first used by Wagner [29] in block cipher cryptanalysis
or Dobbertin [11,12] with his work on the MD5 compression function. It later
became a default approach for analyzing various building blocks in symmetric
cryptography. We for the first time apply this approach to distinguishers using
the division property.
1 We mention that our distinguishers have only a small advantage (approximately a
factor 2) when compared to the generic attack.
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MILP automatic tool to search zero-sum partitions based on division
property. We mainly focus on versions with 4-bit S-Box (PRESENT S-Box).
We find a set of 8 linear equations to represent its division trails table, which is
3 less than the one in [32]. This enables us to obtain 6-round zero-sum partitions
for versions of PHOTON permutation with 4-bit S-Box, which are not given in
[24]. A detailed description of the automatic tool can be found in Sect. 3.1.
Improved zero-sum partitions based on the weakness of PRESENT S-
Box. We further exploit the algebraic normal form (ANF) of the PRESENT S-
Box, and find that when fixing the least significant bit of the input, the algebraic
degree drops from 3 to 2. This property of the S-Box enable us to find zero-sum
partitions based on division property that can improve some of the results in
[27] by 2 of data complexity. Since we look at integral property of both forward
and backward directions of the internal permutations, though this advantage of
our distinguishers for single forward/backward direction is not substantial, when
constructing a zero-sum distinguisher, we can directly gain an advantage of 22 in
size of partitions. The detailed zero-sum partitions of PHOTON permutations
are provided in Sect. 5 and App. C-E of [30].
A method to add one round in the middle. Using the MILP automatic
tool just cited, an attacker can find initial set of texts with active/partial ac-
tive/constant nibbles that satisfy the zero-sum property after a certain number
of decryption - encryption rounds. For the decryption case and for some of these
sets, we choose how to keep/preserve (almost) for free this property adding one
round at the beginning. The basic idea is to choose sets for which (1) some
linear relations (which depend on the MixColumns matrix) hold between the
nibbles that lie on the same column - a property/case which is not investigated
by the MILP automatic tool - and (2) that are mapped in the sets found by the
automatic tool one round before. Such a strategy can be easily described using
the subspace trail notation [17]. Those sets are finally used by the inside-out
approach in order to set up the zero-sum partition. All details are given in Sect.
5.3.
When using the subspace trail to connect two initial zero-sum partitions for both
directions, we also present a generic formula, without writing out the represen-
tation of the state, to compute directly the dimension of combined middle round
from the dimensions of the two initial subspaces.
We note that such strategy to add one round in the middle is not new in litera-
ture. A similar technique is exploited for example by Gilbert in [14] in order to
set up a 8-round integral known-key distinguisher extending the 7-round initial
proposed by Knudsen and Rijmen [20]. However, while Gilbert explains such
result using the super-S-Box notation, we present it using the subspace trail
cryptanalysis. It turns out to be directly applicable for the distinguishers found
by the MILP tool.
Finally, other (different) techniques to gain rounds in the middle have been
proposed e.g. by Boura and Canteaut in [8] to set up a 18-round distinguisher
for Keccak.
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Table 1. PHOTON-n/r/r′ Permutation Distinguishers. We list here the currently best
known results on inner permutations. All variants have full 12 rounds and we focus on
the variants with 4-bits S-Box. “Partition Size N” denotes the size of the zero-sum
partitions.
PHOTON Security # Partition
Property Reference
Variants Claim Rounds Size N
-80/20/16 80
8 28 Multiple Diff. Trail [18]
9 235 Partial Balance [30] (App. C.1)
9 236 Balance [30] (App. C.1)
10 240 Balance [30] (App. C.1)
11 276 Balance [30] (App. C.2)
-128/16/16 128
8 28 Multiple Diff. Trail [18]
9 242 Balance Sect. 3.3
10 247 Balance Sect. 5.1
11 2107 Balance Sect. 5.2
12 2127 Partial Balance Sect. 5.3
-160/36/36 160
8 28 Multiple Diff. Trail [18]
9 243 Partial Balance [30] (App. D.1)
9 244 Balance [30] (App. D.1)
10 248 Balance [30] (App. D.1)
11 2108 Balance [30] (App. D.2)
12 2159 Partial Balance [30] (App. D.3)
-224/32/32 224
8 28 Multiple Diff. Trail [18]
9 2184 Parallel Merging [19]
9 250 Balance [30] (App. E.1)
10 254 Balance [30] (App. E.1)
11 2119 Balance [30] (App. E.2)
12 2184 Balance Sect. 5.4
Zero-sums for hash function PHOTON We apply our zero-sum approach
to the hash functions. Because the utilization of degrees of freedom for PHOTON
is so thin that we can only create 4-round zero-sums for almost all of the variants.
We demonstrate our result on one example in Sect. 6.
2 A Brief Description of PHOTON
The domain extension algorithm of PHOTON is largely inspired from the sponge
functions introduced by Bertoni et al. [6] in 2007. It uses sponge functions frame-
work in order to keep the internal memory size as low as possible.
There are 5 variants of PHOTON and are denoted by PHOTON-n/r/r′,
where n is the bit-size of the hash output, r and r′ are input and output bit-
rate respectively. c is defined as the bit-size of the capacity part of the internal
state, and t = (c+ r) is the internal state size. As a consequence, the 5 internal
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Table 2. Parameters of PHOTON-n/r/r′
Versions Permutation Pt t n c r r
′ d s
PHOTON-80/20/16 P100 100 80 80 20 16 5 4
PHOTON-128/16/16 P144 144 128 128 16 16 6 4
PHOTON-160/36/36 P196 196 160 160 36 36 7 4
PHOTON-224/32/32 P256 256 224 224 32 32 8 4
PHOTON-256/32/32 P288 288 256 256 32 32 6 8
permutations are defined as Pt, where t ∈ {100, 144, 196, 256, 288}. The internal
state of the permutation is, similarly to the AES, viewed as a (d× d) matrix of
s-bit cells and the corresponding values depending on t are given in Table 2.
In this paper we focus on the integral property of the internal permutation
Pt, we therefore describe them in details. For the domain extension function we
refer to [18]. Similar to the AES, four operations are applied to each round below
– AddConstants: applies round-dependent constants to each cell of the first
column.
– SubCells: applies the s-bit S-Box to every cell of the internal state. PRESENT
S-Box is chosen for Pt for t ∈ {100, 144, 196, 256} while AES S-Box is pre-
ferred for P288.
– ShiftRows: rotates each cell located at row i by i positions to the left.
– MixColumnsSerial: updates linearly all columns independently. The ma-
trix underlying the MixColumnsSerial layer is Maximum Distance Separable
(MDS) so as to provide maximal diffusion. We refer to [18] for matrix for
each state size t.
Every PHOTON internal permutation iterates 12 rounds.
Fig. 1. One Round of PHOTON Internal Permutation
3 Zero-sum Partitions and Its Construction Based on
Division Property by MILP
Definition 1. (Zero-sum)[8] Let F be a function from F2n into F2m . A zero-
sum for F of size K is a subset {x1, . . . , xK} ⊂ F2n of elements which sum
to zero and for which the corresponding images by F also sum to zero, i.e.,∑K
i=1 xi =
∑K
i=1 F (xi) = 0.
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In general, given F a permutation over F2n , a much stronger property - named
zero-sum partition - can be investigated.
Definition 2. (Zero-sum Partition)[8] Let P be a permutation from F2n to
F2n . A zero-sum partition for P of size K = 2k is a collection of 2k disjoint
{X1, X2, ..., Xk} sets with the following properties:
– Xi = {xi,1, . . . , xi,2n−k} ⊂ F2n for each i = 1, ..., k and ∪2n−ki=1 Xi = F2n ;
– for each i = 1, ..., 2k:
∑
xi,j∈Xi xi,j =
∑
xi,j∈Xi P (xi,j) = 0.
We focus on creating zero-sum partitions of the permutation P . Assume P is an
iterated permutation of the form P = Rr ◦ · · · ◦R1, where all Ri is permutations
over F2n , named the round function of permutation P . Remember that for the
permutation in a hash function, one can exploit any state starting from an
intermediate state, without knowing any secret element. Assume one can find a
set of texts X = {xi}i and a set of texts Y = {yi}i with the following properties:⊕
i
R−1r ◦ · · · ◦R−1s+1(yi) = 0 and
⊕
i
R1 ◦ · · · ◦Rs(xi) = 0.
For the following, note thatX⊕Y = ⋃y∈Y X⊕y = ⋃x∈X Y⊕x, and |X⊕Y | = K.
Since one can work with the intermediate states, and simply chooses texts in
X ⊕ Y and simply defines the plaintexts pi as the (r − s) rounds decryption of
X⊕Y , and the corresponding ciphertexts ci as the s rounds encryptions of X⊕Y .
A zero-sum partition {pi}i=1,...,K with the properties
∑K
i=1 pi =
∑K
i=1 ci = 0 is
created for permutation P . We will follow this strategy to construct zero-sum
partitions of PHOTON permutations in the following.
Notation - Zero-sum. First we introduce the notations that we are going
to use to present our zero-sums. Let Λ be a collection of state vectors X =
(x0, . . . , x2n−1) where xi ∈ F2m .
– A: if all xi in Λ are distinct, X is called active
– B: if the sum of all xi in Λ can be predicted, X is called balanced
– C: if the values of xi in Λ are equal, X is called passive/constant
– ?: if the sum of all xi in Λ cannot be predicted, X is called unknown
When considering bit-level - i.e. let xi ∈ F2 (the above m is equal to 1), we use
lower case letters instead of uppercase letters, that is a represents an active bit,
b a balance one, c a constant one and ? an unknown bit. For example, “aaac”
in the nibble means that only the least significant bit is constant, all the others
are active. Similarly, “???b” means that only the least significant bit is balanced,
while the rest are unknown. For simplicity, we call a nibble with property “aaac”
as partial active nibble, and “???b” as partial balance nibble in this paper.
Finally, we denote by B a full-balance state of size d × d, and PB a partial-
balance state of size d× d.
3.1 Model Bit-based Division Property Propagation of Operations
by MILP
In this section, we recall how to model the bit-based division property propa-
gation of operations in a cipher by using MILP: copy, XOR, S-Box and Mix-
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Columns. Then we describe the searching strategy for zero-sum partitions based
on MILP of division propagation. Some preliminaries of division property are
provided in App. B.1 of [30], while we refer to [27] and [9] for a formal descrip-
tion of the division property.
Model Operations. We recall how to model the operations in ciphers to con-
struct the MILP [32] - [33].
Model Copy. Let X be an input multiset of copy operation whose elements
x take a value of F2, and Y be the output multiset whose elements (y0, y1)
take a value of F2 × F2. The copy operation creates y = (y0, y1) from x ∈ X
as y0 = x and y1 = x. Assume the input multiset has division property D1k
(since this is on bit-level, we do not distinguish between D1,1k and D1k), then
the corresponding output multiset has division property D1(0,k),(1,k),...,(k,0). Since
we consider bit-based division property, the input multiset division property
D1k must have 0 ≤ k ≤ 1. If k = 0, the output multiset has division property
D1(0,0); otherwise, the output multiset has division property D1(0,1)(1,0). Thus,
(0)
copy−−−→ (0, 0) is the only division trail given the initial division property D10,
and (1)
copy−−−→ (0, 1), (1) copy−−−→ (1, 0) are the two division trails given the initial
division property D11.
Let a
copy−−−→ (b0, b1) denote the division trail of the copy operation x copy−−−→ (y0, y1),
then MILP can describe this by the following inequality: a− b0 − b1 = 0, where
a, b0, b1 ∈ {0, 1} are binaries.
Model XOR. Let X denote the input multiset whose elements x = (x0, x1)
take a value of F2 × F2, and Y denote the output of the XOR operation where
y = x0 ⊕ x1. Assume the input multiset X has division property D2k where
k = (k0, k1), thus the corresponding output multiset Y has division property
D1k0+k1 .
Let (a0, a1)
XOR−−−→ b denote a division trail through XOR operation y = x0 ⊕ x1,
which can be described by MILP through the following equality: a0 + a1− b = 0
where a0, a1, b ∈ {0, 1}.
Model S-Box. Xiang et al. [32] exploited the algebraic normal form (ANF) of
an S-Box, and provided an accurate description the division trail (App. B.1 of
[30]) of an S-Box. For any S-Box, one can easily build the Division Trail Table
(DTT) according to the definition of division property of boolean functions. Next
we describe briefly how to model the DTT of an S-Box by MILP.
At ASIACRYPT 2014, Sun et al. [25] encoded the differential distribution table
of an S-Box to the set of linear equations describing ciphers. The idea is to
choose a set of linear (in)equalities L from the H-Representation of the convex
hull of a set of points A in differential distribution table of an S-Box, such that
the feasible solutions of L are exactly the points in A. By including L as part
of the linear constraints, a MILP can be constructed, and then be solved by
optimization solvers such as CPLEX [1] and Gurobi [2], to search differentials
with the maximum probability. Similarly, for division property, the DTT of S-
Boxes can also be represented as a set of linear (in)equalities and included into
a MILP describing the division trails of a cipher.
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We propose an Algorithm in App. B.2 of [30] to search for the minimum number
of linear (in)equalities to represent the DDT of an S-Box. For PRESENT S-Box
which is used by PHOTON in the inner permutation, we find 8 inequalities (App.
B.2 of [30]) to model the division trails, which is 3 less than [32].2
Model MixColumns. The idea is to represent the matrix in bit level. Given
the polynomial of the field where the multiplications operate on, the represen-
tation of the matrix is unique. For PHOTON permutations based on F24 , the
polynomial is x4 + x+ 1.
Then, dummy binary variables are introduced to describe the multiplication
with the primitive matrix. Denote TMC = (tij)n×n, where the binary dummy
variables tij = 0 if mij = 0. Then the MixColumns operation of Y = MC ×X,
where X = (x0, x1, · · · , xn−1)T and Y = (y0, y1, · · · , yn−1)T , can be modeled as
xj
copy−−−→ (t0j , t1j , · · · , t(n−1)j) and (ti0, ti1, · · · , ti(n−1)) XOR−−−→ yi. For the case of
P144 for PHOTON-128/16/16, n = 24. Then, we can represent MixColumns by
linear equations for copy operation and XOR operation. An example of the bit
representation of PHOTON permutation P144 can be found in App. B.3 of [30].
Objective Function and Rules to Determine the Existence of Zero-
Sum. By modeling the operations of ciphers in the above, we are able to describe
all the operations in a cipher by linear (in)equalities, and call them the set of
linear constraints. In order to construct our MILP, we need to build the objective
function. Let’s first consider a set X with division property D1,nK . If X does not
have any zero-sum property, that is the Xor-sum of X does not balance on any
bit, thus we have
⊕
x∈X piu(x) is unknown for any unit vector u ∈ (F2)n. Since
X has division property D1,nK , there must exist a vector k ∈ K such that u  k 3.
Note that u is a unit vector, thus u = k, which means K contains all the n unit
vectors. On the other hand, if K contains all the n unit vectors over F2n , then
for any 0 6= u ∈ (F2)n there must exist a unit vector e ∈ K such that u  e, that
is
⊕
x∈X piu(x) is unknown. Thus, X does not have any integral property.
Proposition 1. [32] Assume X is a multiset with division property DnK, then X
does not have zero-sum property if and only if K contains all the n unit vectors.
Thus, we only need to detect whether Kr contains all unit vectors. In order
to check the vectors in Kr, it is equivalent to check the last vectors of all r-
round division trails. Denote (a0n−1, · · · , a00)→ · · · → (arn−1, · · · , ar0) an r-round
division trail. Thus, we can set the objective function as Min: ar0 + a
r
1 + · · · +
arn−1. Till now, we completely construct the MILP for the division property
propagation of a cipher.
2 A C/C++ program that verifies our 8 inequalities can cover DDT of PRESENT as
the ones given in [32] can be provided if requested. We note that a smaller number of
inequalities could help to accelerate searching for zero-sum partitions in some cases
(e.g. when the state size is getting large).
3 Let two vectors k = (k0, k1, . . . , km−1) and k′ = (k′0, k
′
1, . . . , k
′
m−1) ∈ Zm, define
k  k′ if ki ≥ k′i for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1; otherwise we denote k  k′.
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Table 3. Number of Rounds of Zero-sums by the MILP Division Property Tool for
PHOTON Internal Permutations, in Forward and Backward Direction
Permutation P100 P144 P196 P256
Forward Direction
#rounds 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6
[27] 12 20 72 12 24 84 12 24 84 12 28 92
Ours 11 20 72 11 23 84 11 24 84 11 27 92
Backward Direction
#rounds 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5
Ours 11 19∗ 71∗ 11 23 83∗ 11 23∗ 83∗ 11 27 91∗
∗ Partial balanced
Now we are ready to apply this MILP-based division property tool to search
for the zero-sums of PHOTON permutations. The zero-sums for variants (both
forward and backward directions) with 4-bit S-Box are given in Table 3. Note
that we can reach more rounds with a number of texts which is less than the
internal state size. The claimed attack complexities by the designers for the
above PHOTON permutation variants are 80, 128, 160 and 224 respectively. We
only list the ones that help to construct our distinguishers later.
3.2 Observation on the Algebraic Degree Decrease
Denote the input and output of PRESENT S-Box as (x3, x2, x1, x0) and (y3, y2, y1, y0),
then the ANF of it is as
y3 = 1⊕ x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x1x2 ⊕ x0x1x2 ⊕ x0x1x3 ⊕ x0x2x3
y2 = 1⊕ x2⊕ x3⊕ x0x1 ⊕ x0x3 ⊕ x1x3 ⊕ x0x1x3 ⊕ x0x2x3
y1 = x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x1x3 ⊕ x2x3 ⊕ x0x1x2 ⊕ x0x1x3 ⊕ x0x2x3
y0 = x0 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x1x2
When x0 is fixed as constant, then the degree of ANF decreases from 3 to 2 (note
that all the terms of degree 3 contains x0). This fact can be used to improve most
of the results found by Todo [27], as we will show the details in the following.
3.3 Simple Zero-sum Partitions for PHOTON Permutations
Given the zero-sums of both forward and backward directions of permutations,
automatically, one can construct many zero-sums. We take P144 for PHOTON-
128/16/16 as an example. As we are going to show in next section, since
B R
−4
←−−−

A C C C C C
A C C C C C
A C C C C C
A C C C C C
A C C C C C
aaac C C C C C
 ,

A C C C C C
C A C C C C
C C A C C C
C C C A C C
C C C C A C
C C C C C aaac
 R5−−→ B
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where B means that the sum is equal to zero in each bit, it is possible to set up
258 9-round zero-sum partitions with size 242, that is
B R
−4
←−−−

A C C C C C
A A C C C C
A C A C C C
A C C A C C
A C C C A C
aaac C C C C aaac
 R5−−→ B.
This example allows us to highlight one more time the possibility to reduce the
degree of the S-Box (from 3 to 2) working with input of the form aaac. Our
zero-sums exploit this observation to reduce the size of the partitions by 22 to
guarantee the zero-sum property.
In [8], Boura and Canteaut looked into the the new bound of the concate-
nated permutation, and add one more round in the middle the zero-sums of
single direction, when the non-linear layer is composed of parallel applications
of smaller S-boxes. In the next, we apply Subspace trail cryptanalysis to extend
one more round in the middle of the zero-sums, and show our applications to
PHOTON permutation.
4 Subspace Trails
Subspace Trail Cryptanalysis [17] was recently introduced at FSE 2017. We
recall the main concept of such a notation, and refer to [17] for more details.
Our treatment here is however meant to be self-contained.
4.1 Subspace Trails of AES-like Permutations
Since PHOTON permutation is an AES-like cipher, in this section we recall
the subspace trails of AES presented in [17]. For the following, we only work
with vectors and vector spaces over Fn×n2m for fixed m,n, and we denote by
{e0,0, ..., en−1,n−1} the unit vectors of Fn×n2m (e.g. ei,j has a single 1 in row i and
column j).
Definition 3. The column spaces Ci are defined as Ci = 〈e0,i, e1,i, e2,i, ..., en−1,i〉.
For instance, if n = 4 then C0 corresponds to the symbolic matrix
C0 =
{x0 0 0 0x1 0 0 0x2 0 0 0
x3 0 0 0
 ∣∣∣∣ ∀xi ∈ F2m , i = 0, 1, 2, 3}≡
x0 0 0 0x1 0 0 0x2 0 0 0
x3 0 0 0
 .
Definition 4. The diagonal spaces Di and the inverse-diagonal spaces IDi are
respectively defined as Di = SR−1(Ci) and IDi = SR(Ci):
Di = 〈e0,i, e1,(i+1), e2,(i+2), ..., en−1,(i+n−1)〉,
IDi = 〈e0,i, e1,(i−1), e2,(i−2), ..., en−1,(i−n+1)〉
where all the indexes are taken modulo n.
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For instance, if n = 4 then D0 and ID0 correspond to symbolic matrix
D0 ≡
x0 0 0 00 x1 0 00 0 x2 0
0 0 0 x3
 , ID0 ≡
x0 0 0 00 0 0 x10 0 x2 0
0 x3 0 0

for all xi ∈ F2m , i = 0, 1, 2, 3.
Definition 5. The i-th mixed spaces Mi are defined as Mi = MC(IDi).
For instance, for PHOTON permutation P144, n = 6 and m = 4 - working in
GF (24) ≡ GF (2)[X]/(X4 +X + 1) - then M0 corresponds to symbolic matrix
M0 =

1 2 8 5 8 2
2 5 1 2 6 12
12 9 15 8 8 13
13 5 11 3 10 1
1 15 13 14 11 8
8 2 3 3 2 8
× ID0 ≡

x0 2x1 8x2 5x3 8x4 2x5
2x0 12x1 6x2 2x3 x4 5x5
12x0 13x1 8x2 8x3 15x4 9x5
13x0 x1 10x2 3x3 11x4 5x5
x0 8x1 11x2 14x3 13x4 15x5
8x0 8x1 2x2 3x3 3x4 2x5

for all xi ∈ F2m , i = 0, 1, . . . , 5.
Definition 6. Let I ⊆ {0, 1, ..., n− 1}. The subspaces CI , DI , IDI and MI are
defined as: CI =
⊕
i∈I Ci, DI =
⊕
i∈I Di, IDI =
⊕
i∈I IDi, MI =
⊕
i∈IMi.
As shown in detail in [17], for any coset DI ⊕ a there exists unique b ∈ C⊥I such
that R(DI ⊕ a) = CI ⊕ b. Similarly, for any coset CI ⊕ a there exists unique
b ∈M⊥I such that R(CI ⊕ a) =MI ⊕ b.
Theorem 1. For each I and each a ∈ D⊥I , there exists one and only one b ∈
M⊥I s.t.
R2(DI ⊕ a) =MI ⊕ b. (1)
We refer to [17] for a proof of this statement. We limit to observe that b depends
on the initial constant a that defines the coset DI ⊕ a and on the secret key k.
5 Improved Zero-sum Partitions of P144 for PHOTON-
128/16/16 and P256 for PHOTON-224/32/32
We show how to extend the simple zero-sum partitions in Sect. 3.3 by adding
one round in the middle for “free” using the subspace trail cryptanalysis. We
emphasize that since this technique is very general, it can be used more generally
for any AES-like cipher (as an example, a similar technique allows to explain the
8-round zero-sum partition of AES proposed by Gilbert4 in [14] starting from
the 7-round one proposed in [20]). All the details are only given for the 10-round
case. The other cases - 11- and 12-round of P144 and all zero-sums of P100, P196
and P256 - are obtained using the same strategy.
4 In order to explain such result, Gilbert propose that super-Sbox notation, where
super-Sbox(·) := S-Box ◦ARK ◦MC◦ S-Box(·). The same result has been explained
in details in [16] using the subspace trail notation.
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5.1 10-round Zero-sum Partitions for P144 of size 2
47
In order to set up a 10 round partitioning, we first re-write the simple 9-round
zero-sum partition for P144 using the subspace trail notation. Since we use the
same strategy also for the next zero-sums, we give here all the details. For the
following, we define C′I and D′I for some I ⊆ {0, 1, 2, 3} as subspaces of CI and DI
respectively, for which some nibbles are only partially active (i.e. some nibbles
can have some active bits and some constant bits). Let C′0 and D′0 defined as
C′0 ≡

x0 0 0 0 0 0
x1 0 0 0 0 0
x2 0 0 0 0 0
x3 0 0 0 0 0
x4 0 0 0 0 0
y 0 0 0 0 0
 , D′0 ≡

x0 0 0 0 0 0
0 x1 0 0 0 0
0 0 x2 0 0 0
0 0 0 x3 0 0
0 0 0 0 x4 0
0 0 0 0 0 y
 ,
for all xi ∈ F24 , 0 ≤ i ≤ 4 and for all y = 2 · y′ where y′ can take any value in
F23 . It follows that
B R
−4←−−− D′0 ⊕ C′0 ⊕ a R
5−−→ B.
How to add one round in the middle for “free”? The idea is to extend
the previous 9-round zero-sum adding one round in the middle, exploiting the
fact that a coset of a column space CI is always mapped into a coset of a mixed
spaceMI after one round. In more details, using the MILP automatic tool based
on division property, one can only found “zero-sum” for which the nibbles can
only be active/partial active or constant. This means that other more generic
possible cases are not considered, including the one for which some particular
(linear) relationships between the nibbles hold. In the following we show how to
use subspace trails and the results found by the tool in order to derive these cases.
For completeness, we emphasize that the 8-round zero-sum partition proposed
by Gilbert [14] - using the super-S-Box view - starting from the 7-round one of
Knudsen and Rijmen [20] can be derived using the same technique based on the
subspace trail notation.
By Theorem 1, it follows that for each constant a there exists a constant b
such that
R(C′0 ⊕ a) ⊆ R(C0 ⊕ a) = M0 ⊕ b,
where C′0 ⊆ C0. Before we go on, note that S-Box(·) is a non-linear operation.
It follows that while S-Box(aaaa) is well defined (i.e. S-Box(aaaa) = aaaa), S-
Box(aaac) is not defined in general5. Thus, we replace the subspace C′I (where
some nibbles are only partially active) with the corresponding subspace CI
(where all the nibbles are only constant or completely active). Note that if the
zero-sum property holds for C′I , it also holds for CI since CI ≡
⋃
x∈CI\C′I C
′
I ⊕ x
5 More precisely, S-Box(aaac) is a subset of 8 elements of {0x0, 0x1, ..., 0xf}. On the
other hand, such subset depends on the details of the S-Box function and doesn’t
have any particular property.
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where C′I ⊆ CI . Thus, we introduce X defined as X ≡ D′0⊕M0 of dimension 47,
that is
X =

x6 2x1 8x2 5x3 8x4 2x5
2x0 x7 6x2 2x3 x4 5x5
12x0 13x1 x8 8x3 15x4 9x5
13x0 x1 10x2 x9 11x4 5x5
x0 8x1 11x2 14x3 x10 15x5
8x0 8x1 2x2 3x3 3x4 2x5 ⊕ y

for all xi ∈ F24 with 0 ≤ i ≤ 10 and for all y = 2 · y′ as before (where y′ can take
any value in F23). In App. A of [30] we present a generic formula that allows to
compute directly the dimension of X from the dimensions of the initial subspaces
D′I and C′J .
10-round zero-sums. Since for each constant b X ⊕ b = ⋃c∈D′0M0⊕ (b⊕ c) =⋃
d∈M0 D′0 ⊕ (b⊕ d), it follows that
B R
−4←−−−
⋃
c
C0 ⊕ c R
−1←−−− X ⊕ b ≡
⋃
d∈M0
D′0 ⊕ (b⊕ d) R
5−−→ B.
As a result, starting in the middle with a coset of X implies zero-sum after
5-round decryption/encryption, that is B R
−5
←−−− X ⊕ b R
5
−−→ B. Thus for partitions
in X ⊕ b of size 247, we construct 10-round zero-sum partition for P144. This
complexity is significantly below the birthday bound of the security level 264.
5.2 11-round Zero-sum Partitions for P144 of size 2
107
As before, we first present the simple10-round zero-sums found by the tool:
B R
−5
←−−−

A A A C C C
A A A C C C
A A A C C C
A A A A C C
A A A A C C
A A A A C C
 ,

A C C C C C
C A C C C C
C C A C C C
C C C A C C
C C C C A C
C C C C C ccca
 R5−−→ B
Let D′0 defined as before, and let
C0,1,2 ⊕ (C3 ∩ D0,1,5) =

x0 x6 x12 0 0 0
x1 x7 x13 0 0 0
x2 x8 x14 0 0 0
x3 x9 x15 x18 0 0
x4 x10 x16 x19 0 0
x5 x11 x17 x20 0 0
 , ∀xi ∈ F24 , 0 ≤ i ≤ 20.
Thus, for each constant a:
B R
−5
←−−− D′0 ⊕ C0,1,2 ⊕ (C3 ∩ D0,1,5)⊕ a R
5
−−→ B.
This size of these 10-round zero-sums found by the tool is 289, which is much
higher than the one proposed in the previous section obtained by extending in
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the middle of a 9-round exploiting the subspace trail. Similar to before, for each
constant a there exists unique b such that after one round encryption
R(C0,1,2 ⊕ (C3 ∩ D0,1,5)⊕ a) =M0,1,2 ⊕ (M3 ∩ C0,1,5)⊕ b.
Let X defined as X ≡ D′0 ⊕M0,1,2 ⊕ (M3 ∩ C0,1,5) of dimension 107. By similar
argumentation as before, for each b, we have
B R
−6
←−−− X ⊕ b R
5
−−→ B.
Thus, one can construct 11-round zero-sum partitions of size 2107 for P144.
5.3 12-round Zero-sum Partitions of P144
Impossibility to set up a 12-round zero-sum partition with full balance.
By tool, the best result (in term of minimum number of active bits) that we
obtained for 11-round P144 is given by
B R
−5
←−−−

A A A C C C
A A A C C C
A A A C C C
A A A A C C
A A A A C C
A A A A C C
 ,

A C C C A A
A A C C C A
A A A C C C
A A A A C C
C A A A A C
C C A A A A
 R6−−→ B.
Thus, it is possible to construct a 11-round zero-sums, that is
B R
−5
←−−−

A A A C A A
A A A C C A
A A A C C C
A A A A C C
A A A A A C
A A A A A A
 R6−−→ B.
Also in this case, we can re-write these zero-sums using the subspace trail nota-
tion. In particular, denoted by Z ≡ [D0,1,2⊕(D3∩C0,1,2)]⊕[C0,1,2⊕(C3∩D0,1,5)],
it follows that B R
−5
←−−− Z R
6
−−→ B.
In the same way as before, one can try to extend these zero-sums in the
middle. However, the dimension of X ≡ R(C)∩D in this case is equal to dim =
144 (we refer to App. A for all the details).
It follows that this is an example for which it is not possible to set up a 12-
round zero-sum partition starting from a 11-round one and using the strategy
just presented.
12-round partial zero-sum partition for P144 of size 2
127. By tool, we
found the following 12-round partial zero-sum partition of P144 of size 2
127:
PB R
−6
←−−−

A A A A A C
A A A A A C
A A A A A C
A A A A A C
A A A A A aaac
A A A A A A
 R6−−→ B.
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5.4 Full-Round Zero-sum Partitions of P256 for PHOTON-224/32/32
In this subsection, we propose a full-round zero-sum of P256 for PHOTON-
224/32/32. Let’s start with the following 11-round zero-sum partition found by
the tool
PB R
−5
←−−−

A A A C C C C C
A A A C C C C C
A A A C C C C C
A A A C C C C C
A A A C C C C C
A A A C C C C C
A A A C C C C C
A A C C C C C C
 ,

A C C C C C A A
A A C C C C C C
A A A C C C C C
C A A A C C C C
C C A A A C C C
C C C A A A C C
C C C C A A A C
C C C C C A A A
 R
6
−−→ B
which can be rewritten using the subspace trail notation as B R
−5
←−−− Z ⊕ a R
6
−−→
B for each constant a, where Z ≡ [C0,1 ⊕ (C2 ∩ D0,1,3,4,5,6,7)]⊕[D0,7 ⊕ (D6 ∩
C0,1,2,3,4,5,6)
]
. Using the subspace trail cryptanalysis (see Sect. 5.1 for details),
let the space X defined as
X ≡ [M0,1 ⊕ (M2 ∩ C0,1,3,4,5,6,7)]⊕[D0,7 ⊕ (D6 ∩ C0,1,2,3,4,5,6)]
of dimension 184. Since for each b:
B R
−6
←−−− X ⊕ b R
6
−−→ B,
it is possible to set up full-round zero-sum partitions for P256.
6 Zero-sum Partitions for the PHOTON Hash Functions
The utilization of degrees of freedom has always been one of the most power-
ful cryptanalyst tool for sponge-like hash functions, thus reducing this ability
as much as possible greatly increases the confidence in the sponge-like hash
function’s security. For PHOTON, this “small-r” sponge-like shape makes the
amount of freedom degrees available at the input of each internal permutation
call during the absorbing phase is extremely small. Thus, even though we manage
to find the full-round distinguishers for the internal permutation, the amount of
freedom degrees is so thin that utilizing this flaw will not threaten the security
of PHOTON as a hash function.
In this section, we explain our results for hash function PHOTON. Following
the sponge strategy, at iteration i PHOTON absorbs the message block mi on
leftmost part of the internal state Si, and then applies the permutation Pt.
Following that is the squeezing phase. We take PHOTON-160/36/36 as the
example, and the absorbing positions of the state array are underlined as below
s0,0 s0,1 s0,2 s0,3 s0,4 s0,5 s0,6
s1,0 s1,1 s1,2 s1,3 s1,4 s1,5 s1,6
s2,0 s2,1 s2,2 s2,3 s2,4 s2,5 s2,6
s3,0 s3,1 s3,2 s3,3 s3,4 s3,5 s3,6
s4,0 s4,1 s4,2 s4,3 s4,4 s4,5 s4,6
s5,0 s5,1 s5,2 s5,3 s5,4 s5,5 s5,6
s6,0 s6,1 s6,2 s6,3 s6,4 s6,5 s6,6

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With data of size 220, we can find a 4-round zero-sum partition for PHOTON-
160/36/36. 
A A A A A C C
C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C
C C C C C C C
 R4−−→ B
7 Comparison with Generic Approaches
A natural question to ask here is how generic approaches to construct zero-sums
or zero-sum partitions compare with our dedicated approach for PHOTON. Here
we tackle this question, considering as starting point the zero-sum results on
Keccak.
We first briefly recall the generic method for constructing a zero-sum struc-
ture which is inspired by the attack against XHASH in [4] (brought to at-
tention of Keccak Team [5] by Jean-Philippe Aumasson). The strategy is the
following. Assume we are looking for a set Z = {zi} of N elements in F2n
such that
⊕
i zi =
⊕
i f(zi) = 0. As first step, one considers N random value
xi ∈ F2n and computes X = {xi||f(xi)}i where xi||f(xi) ∈ F22n . Let A =⊕
X xi||f(xi) ≡
⊕
X xi||
⊕
X f(xi). If A is equal to zero (prob. 2
−2n), then
the problem is solved. Assume A 6= 0. The idea is to consider other M ran-
dom elements - for a certain M - yi ∈ F2n and compute {yi||f(yi)}i. Then,
one computes binary coefficients {ai}i=0,...,M that satisfy the following equality⊕M
i=0 ai · (xi||f(xi)⊕ yi||f(yi)) = A.
Observe that such condition is satisfied with non-negligible property if M >
2N - in particular6, it is satisfied with probability higher than 99.99% if M =
2N + 10.
Assume that a solution of the previous equality is found. The set Z = {zi}
is defined as
zi ≡
{
ai · yi ⊕ (1⊕ ai) · xi, if i ≤M
xi, if i > M
Such set provided a solution of the problem, and the total cost of this algorithm
is well approximated by N computations/encryptions.
For a zero-sum distinguisher, in order to construct the set Z, one needs to
start from some intermediate state and compute forward and backward to get
the input and output of the zero-sum. Since for our zero-sums for PHOTON
permutation, the number of forward and backward rounds are almost equal, we
assume the computations equivalent of N/2 calls to the permutations. Also we
assume the cost of encryption and decryption are the same. For the values of
6 Given a fixed set {ai}i, they satisfy the required equality with probability 2−2n.
It follows that given 2n + ε sets, at least one of them satisfy it with probability
1 − (1 − 2−2n)2n+ε ≈ 1 − eε, assuming 2n  1. For a probability of success higher
than 99.99%, it follows ε ≥ 10.
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partition size N given in Table 1, our method for generating zero-sum structures
as distinguishers for PHOTON, is more efficient than the generic method by a
factor 2. For instance, consider the case of P256 for PHOTON-224/32/32, the
complexity of generating our full round distinguisher needs 6/12 × 2184 = 2183
encryptions while for the generic method it is 2184 encryptions.
There are a number of related zero-sum results in the literature, most promi-
nently perhaps a full-round result on Keccak (NIST SHA-3) [3,8,13]. In all these
works, the computational complexity difference between zero-sum method and
the generic method is usually very small (a factor 2). Even if a distinguisher
can be considered meaningful only if this difference is significant, the Keccak
Team published a note [5] where they confirmed the validity of such distin-
guishers: “[...] the zero-sum distinguishers of [3,8] are valid, albeit with a very
small advantage”. Our approach to set up zero-sum distinguishers on PHOTON
permutation follows the same philosophy.
Before we go on, one may ask the implication of a zero-sum distinguisher.
Indeed, even if it provides a way to distinguish a permutation from a random
one, for a hash function it is still difficult that the distinguisher can be used
to set up an attack. To give a concrete example of implications of a zero-sum
distinguisher, we recall its implication on Keccak (Sect. 4 of [5]). The Keccak
Team claimed it is very unlikely that the zero-sum distinguishers can result in
actual attacks against Keccak calling (reduced-round) versions of Keccak-f , but
still they confirmed the distinguishers described in [3,8] show non-ideal properties
of the (reduced round) Keccak-f permutation and they decided to increase the
number of rounds (e.g., for Keccak-f [1600] from 18 to 24 rounds) in round 2
of the SHA-3 competition. Since PHOTON follows exactly the classical sponge
strategy, we would believe our full-round zero-sum distinguishers for PHOTON
permutations have similar implications on the family of hash functions to the
ones on Keccak hash function.
Finally, we emphasize that such distinguishers based on zero-sum cannot be
considered meaningless because they cannot be set up for any arbitrary number
of rounds. In other words, the inside-out approach used in this paper and in lit-
erature to set up distinguishers doesn’t work for any arbitrary number of rounds
of the inner permutation of the Sponge function. For example, it is not possi-
ble to set up a zero-sum distinguisher in the case of PHOTON-80/20/16 with
12-round, while it is possible for the other cases. In these last cases and in the
same way, if the number of rounds of PHOTON inner permutations are increased
from 12 to (e.g.) 16, our zero-sum distinguishers proposed in this paper can not
cover the full inner permutation, which then becomes indistinguishable from a
pseudo-random permutation as in the assumptions/requirements provided by
the sponge construction/design.
8 Conclusions
We presented zero-sum-related properties of the full-round permutation of many
members of the PHOTON family of hash functions. Observations on the used S-
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Box, a tool-approach to finding division trails, and an inside-out approach with
a technique to add a round in the middle are important ingredients. This seems
to be the first time that the individual techniques that we employ are used in
combination, and the result is on the full version of an ISO standard.
Our results are theoretical in nature and we stress that there is currently no
reason to believe that the security of PHOTON as a hash function is endangered.
It will be interesting to see applications of our approach to other constructions.
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